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1. Introduction
End-of-pipe options are needed whenever recycling and source reduction can not cope with
waste streams at acceptable costs. One of the disposal options is waste incineration. The
incineration of waste was considered ‘clean’ for a long time. In the 1970s and 1980s it
proved that the incineration of municipal waste was a significant source of air pollution.
Notorious pollutants were hydrogen chloride, hydrogen florid, sulphur dioxide, oxides of
nitrogen, fine particulate matter, ‘heavy metals’ and dioxins and furans. Most notorious and
issue of public anxiety in some countries were emissions of dioxins and that might cause
cancer and birth defects (Eberg 1997, EC 1997). Municipal waste is domestic waste from
households and comparable waste from markets and companies. Consent is present that in
the long history of waste incinerators, incineration in plants started in Europe around 1900,
important steps to secure health and the environment have been taken and will be taken in
the future. Debates are still going on the level of emissions that is negligible and acceptable.
Also in the European arena waste management is about knowledge, perceptions,
uncertainties and negotiations (Weale 1992). Arguments are on the right level of ambition
and the right level of fine-tuning where precautionary measures are discussed (EC 1997).
The European Union decided to issue two European Directives on the atmospheric
emissions from municipal waste incineration in 1989. This chapter focuses on the
implementation and effects of the 1989 Directives. In section 2 of this chapter we
summarise the bargaining on the 1989 European Directives. Section 2 indicates that
characteristics of municipal waste incineration and the level of pre-existing national
regulation sectors in individual member states played decisive roles. When the 1989
Directives came into force, the requirements had to be integrated in the national legislation
in European Member States. In section 3 Germany and the Netherlands will prove to have
been most ambitious, the United Kingdom followed on a respectable distance and France
integrated the European minimal requirements into French law. The restructuring of the
municipal waste incineration sectors in the four IMPOL countries is also described in
section 3. In section 4 the outcomes are evaluated. The evaluation criteria are the level of
goal attainment and the contribution of the European Directives in section 4.1. In section
4.2 the efficiency of allocating abatement efforts and cost-effectiveness of abatement
efforts at individual sources are assessed. In section 5 some conclusions are drawn and some
observations are presented. Summarising some of the key-outcomes of the four case
studies, keeping in mind that the dawn has broken for the implementation of a new and
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more ambitious ‘Directive Incineration of Waste’ in the 00s of the 21st century: Although
the four IMPOL countries are all north-west European countries, the outcomes of the
national implementation processes of the 1989 Directives differ enormously. This chapter
shows that implementation proves to be a highly interactive process that is strongly
interrelated to the dynamics of contextual drivers and contextual policies in individual
member states. In the period 1990-1996 the decrease of regulated emissions in IMPOL
countries varied between roughly 25% and 90%. In some cases retrofitting costs were
avoided by closing down incinerators, in one case retrofitting costs were avoided by lax
enforcement towards non-complying plants. Technology packages for retrofitting varied
according to the respective national ambition levels in the IMPOL countries. Roughly
estimated retrofitting of incinerators increased incineration tariffs by 12 to over 75 Euro
for every ton of waste incinerated. Countries with a high environmental performance with
respect to the pollutants regulated by the Directives allocated the costs related to the
abatement in a rather inefficient way. The European Directives had the highest impact on
goal attainment in the countries that defined lower ambition levels. In those countries
allocation of abatement costs was done more efficient. The presented analysis is
predominately withdrawn from the national case studies by Bültman and Wätzold (2000),
Eames (2000), Lulofs (1999) and Schucht (2000). The analysis on the plant level was
focused on the approximately 400 existing incinerators for municipal waste in the four
IMPOL countries. The research period covers the years 1989-1999 with a focus on the
years 1989-1996.
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2. Bargaining the European Directives
The European Directives 89/369/EEC of 8 June 1989 and 89/429/EEC of 21 June 1989
aimed at reducing air emissions from municipal waste incinerators. The European Directive
89/369/EEC sets standards for so-called new incinerators, being licensed after 1 December
1990. The Directive 89/429/EEC regulated the existent incinerators, being licensed before 1
December 1990. The directives came into force after a relative short period of negotiations
and without major adjustments. Previous studies roughly indicated that, unlike the emission
limits on large combustion plants in 88/609/EEC, the emission limits on municipal waste
incineration plants were set almost effortlessly. The hazardous nature of the emissions from
municipal waste incinerators was well documented and regulation was experienced as
inevitable. There was no substantial opposition described from environmental groups or
from industry (Brusco, Bertossi and Cottica, 1996).
Our study indicates supplementary that the negotiations in the European political arena
were of some importance. Some national characteristics proved influential. The national
waste policies, national waste markets and pre-existing national regulation of emissions are
important key-explaining factors for both the European bargaining process and the follow-
up events in the IMPOL countries. The European Directives implied high retrofitting costs
on those countries that valued waste incineration and did not yet issue strict regulation
towards municipal waste incinerators. However not all countries valued incineration equally.
In the relevant period the United Kingdom was in the European waste incineration backfield
(10% of waste incinerated). In increasing order Germany, France and the Netherlands where
in the midfield. Denmark (60%), Luxembourg (60%) and Switzerland (80%) were
frontrunners in the field (Hartenstein and Horvay, 1996). Seen from the alternative
perspective of landfill Greece and Ireland were the frontrunners (100% landfill), the United
Kingdom still showed 90 % landfill. The corresponding number for Germany is 70% and for
France and the Netherlands 52% (Buclet and Godard, 2000).
These 'first glance' impressions have to be assessed in the context of the -dynamics in-
national waste policies and resulting waste-markets. In Germany and the Netherlands the
waste policy was developed relatively early prioritising re-use and recycling in the mid- and
late 1980s. Within the category of disposal options, incineration is favoured over landfill.
Although in Germany the share of incineration increased, there is still much more waste
landfilled than incinerated (69.6% compared to 21.4% in 1993). The waste policy in France
preferred cheap options until 1992. Between 1992 and 1998 the waste policy was not
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always unambiguously. It first prioritised a reduction of landfill and an increase in material-
and energy recycling. This change in waste hierarchy introduced uncertainty, regions had to
redefine waste management. In the late 1990s this was readjusted in the sense that organic
recycling and material recycling were to be increased and landfills had to be chosen as
solution only where necessary. In the UK the waste policy also developed relatively late.
The discretion space for de-central actors to choose the relatively cheap landfill option was
large. In urban areas badly designed incinerators were present. Table 1 presents some key
characteristics from national waste policies, waste markets and the incineration sector.
Table 1:  Some characteristics of national waste policies,
waste markets and waste incineration sectors
France Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
Waste policy Prioritised cheap
options until, 1992
equal status material
and energy recycling,
1998 organic recycling
and material recycling
prioritised 
Prioritised re-use and
recycling in 1986
Prioritised organic
recycling and material
recycling in 1989
Poorly articulated until
1995. Since 1995
energy-from-waste was
given an equivalent
status to recycling and
composting
Trend in incineration
in landfill
Incineration favoured
over landfill and of
considerable
importance, ban on
landfill for combus-
tibles from 2002
The share of
incineration increases,
but there is still more
waste landfilled than
incinerated
Incineration important
and favoured starting
1989, ban on landfill for
combustibles from
1996
Unrelenting emphasis
cheap-landfill option,
Non Fossil Fuel
Obliga-tion has re-
vitalised large scale
incinera- tion since
1995 
Number of
incinerators
302 in 1989
297 in 1993
42 in 1980
48 in 1990
61 in 1999
13 in 1989
7 early 1990s
11 in 1999
40 in 1987
4 in 1996
10 in 1999
Capacity of
Incinerators
1993 around
80 % < 6 t/h
20 % > 6t/h
around 1989
almost all > 6 t/h
around 1989 all but one
> 6 t/h
Around 1990 all but 4 >
6 t/h
Market structure Regional monopolies Regional monopolies Regional monopolies Regional monopolies
Possibility to pass
on retrofitting costs
Small due to budget
constraints and local
democracy
Large Large Small due to de-central
budget constraints and
competition from cheap
landfill
National regulation
compared to
Lax in general and
moderate for new
incinerators starting
1986
Strict Strict Lax
Table 1 illustrates that the impacts from the European Directives were likely to be marginal
in Germany and the Netherlands. In Germany landfill was cheaper. However the regional
monopolies made it possible to pass on retrofitting costs if incineration was chosen.
Although landfill was also cheaper in the Netherlands, the chosen priorities in waste policy,
the strict national regulation and the ability to pass on retrofitting costs made the European
Directives a marginal issue in the Netherlands. For France and the United Kingdom the
impacts of the draft Directives were likely to be substantial. For the United Kingdom this
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was not a big threat because the national waste policy did not favour incineration over
landfill. The substantial number of rather old-fashioned incinerators was regulated only very
lax (Loader 1991). Closing down these incinerators would not cause a political debate of
importance. In France the waste policy did favour incineration. This was combined with
cheaper landfill, relatively lax regulation of incinerators and limited possibilities to pass on
the costs (Bertossi et al. 1994, Buclet and Godard 2000:211). When the drafts of the 1989
Directives were discussed France perceived that the Directive would be a very ambitious
project for the French incineration sector. It is not surprising that France participated in a
coalition that tried to reduce the level of ambition of the Directives by objecting to
standards for dioxin emissions that were already discussed at that time. Furthermore some
countries including France tried to prolong the deadlines for bringing the plants into
compliance and to differentiate the deadlines depending on the capacity of the plant. This
in order to be able to spread investment costs, often to be incurred by de-central
governments, over a longer period of time. The estimated costs turned out to be gigantic.
With respect to the progressive deadlines the idea was to start bringing big incinerators into
compliance and to leave the small plants time until 2000, so the municipalities could keep
the small plants running, thus amortise their investment and then shut them down. France
did not really fight for the very small plants of a capacity below 1 t/h but envisaged to - in
the long term - close these plants. It seems that the French actors affected by the
Directives were either well prepared - this holds true for industry - or did not see the
problems that might arise for France. The later means at that time not fully considering the
implications of the 1989 Directives. This holds true for the municipalities and the Ministry
for the Environment. The municipalities, represented by AMORCE2 and the AMF
(Association of French Mayors) on the one hand were not yet organised with respect to
environmental questions. The producers of incinerator equipment and private operators of
waste incineration plants feared that municipalities could not invest enough, however they
had an interest in sufficient environmental standards for the image of the sector (Schucht
2000)3.
The bargaining led to differentiated emission standards according to capacity and age of the
plant. These standards have a better potential for cost-efficiency compared to uniform
emission limits. In 89/369/EEC the categories are plants smaller than 1 ton each hour (t/h),
plants between 1 and 3 t/h and plant larger than 3 
t/h. According to 89/429/EEC the existing
incinerators have to comply with predominantly the same emission standards as new
incinerators if the incineration capacity of the plant is larger than 6 t/h from 1 December
1996 onwards. For existing incinerators with a capacity of less than 6 t/h there is a
transitional arrangement until December 2000. The existing incinerators had to meet the
transitional emission limits on 1 December 1995.  As from December 2000 those
incinerators have to meet the same requirements as new incinerators. The indirect
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requirements to abate dioxins were also softened for existing incinerators.
Table 2: Emission requirements according to capacity of the incinerator, emission limits in
mg/m3. Standardised conditions 273 degrees K, 101,3 Kpa, 11% Oxygen or 9% CO2
Emission limits for existent incinerators starting 1
December 1996 if the capacity > 6t/h, otherwise
starting 1 December 2000 and for new incinerators
starting 1 December 1990
Emission limits for existent
plants < 6t/h between
1 December 1995 and
1 December 2000
Plant
Pollutant
< 1 t/h 1 t/h- 3 t/h > 3 t/h <1t/h 1-6t/h
Dust 200 100 30 600 100
Pb+Cr+Cu+Mn - 5 5 - -
Ni+As - 1 1 - -
Cd+Hg - 0.2 0.2 - -
HCl 250 100 50 - -
HF «divided» 4 2 - -
SO2 - 300 300 - -
CO 100 100 100 100 100
Organic Compounds 20 20 20 - -
Meanwhile the European Commission decided to prepare a new ‘Directive Incineration of
Waste’ that was publishes as a draft in 1994. This new Directive will probably dominate the
00s of the 21st century. The European Commission raised the ambition to roughly the level
of the emission limits that are already in use in Germany and the Netherlands. In some
MWI-related research Belgium, Italy and Spain are assessed largely comparable to France
while Sweden and Austria are roughly assessed as comparable to Germany and the
Netherlands. Finally the United Kingdom broadly represents countries having intermediate
levels of ambition (EC 1997: v, 1.2).
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3. Frontrunners and Laggards Analysed
In this section the story will be how Germany and the Netherlands as front-runners and
France and the United Kingdom as relative laggards coped with the European Directives.
Two perspectives are relevant. Firstly the EU-Directives 89/369/EEC and 89/429/EEC were
not directly binding in the EU member States. They addressed national governments that
were obliged to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
necessary to comply with the Directives no later than 1 December 1990. Secondly the
national waste incineration sectors had to be restructured in order to comply with the
national standards. A number of options were available for restructuring. The first choice
was between compliance and non-compliance. A choice for compliance could be followed by
three actions. The first one was to close plants, the second choice was to downgrade plants
so that they would become smaller plants and the third choice was retrofitting plants. This
section describes the choices made and clarifies the factors that influenced these choices,
including national monitoring and enforcement efforts.
3.1. The frontrunners
The central issues and events that dominated the story-lines in Germany and the
Netherlands are quite comparable. In section 3.1.1 the German case will be presented. It will
be summarised in figure 1. Afterwards the Dutch case will be presented and some small
aberrance's will turn out.
3.1.1. Integration and norm-realisation in Germany
Germany was the only IMPOL country that managed to integrate the European
requirements in time. The special ordinance that integrated the European requirements was
enacted on 23 November 1990. The German 'TA Luft 1986' was the relevant predeceasing
air pollution regulation. The emission limit values set in the 'TA Luft' of 1986 are either
equal or stricter compared to the requirements in the European Directives. The 1986
guideline, issued under the  'Federal Emmissions Control Act of 1974' did not yet set an
emission limit for dioxins, but only demands plant operators to reduce dioxin emissions as
far as possible. The mentioned general 'Federal Emissions Control Act of 1974' (Bundes-
Immissionsschutzgesetz - BImSchG) proclaims that plants with high ecological risks require
prior authorisation. One of the most important technical guidelines that amended the
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'Federal Immission Control Act' was the 'Technical Guideline on the Prevention of Air
Pollution' (Technische Anleitung zur Reinhaltung der Luft – TA Luft). This guideline was
first enacted in 1974 and included emission limit values (in mg/m3). In 1986 the guideline
was significantly tightened into the mentioned 'TA Luft 1986'. However action groups and
environmental organisations were still not satisfied with it. Already in the 1980s, the
German public was highly concerned about emissions from waste incinerators, particularly
about dioxin emissions. While ordinances have the same status as acts, technical guidelines
have the status of administrative guidelines and thus are binding only for the public
administration. Therefore they are only binding within the public administration, but have
no direct effect towards citizens and courts. Plants had to comply with the limits only after
the limits were incorporated in the plants’ individual license. Meanwhile, it is widely
accepted (in legal theory and practice) that courts generally have to include the provisions
of the 'TA Luft' in their decisions. Nevertheless, they may take differing decisions
whenever there are compelling reasons to do so, for example when research produced new
knowledge which was not yet adopted by the technical instructions (see Kahl/Voßkuhle
1995: 7-8 and 112-114).
Soon after the 'TA Luft 1986' was issued, the 'Federal Ministry of the Environment'
(Bundesministerium für Umwelt - BMU) wanted to set even stricter emission limits. A key
driver was found in responding to the public’s high environmental concern regarding waste
incinerators and an ordinance was prepared. The choice for an ordinance instead of a
technical guideline is to a large extent the result of blocking of authorisation processes by
citizens’ action groups and environmental organisations. In many cases all the courts were
used, it delayed the authorisation for up to 8 years. The blocking hindered the disposal of
municipal waste and led to lengthy authorisation procedures that were very time-consuming
for the licensing authorities. Therefore the BMU and the German federal states were
interested in accelerating authorisation procedures. Unlike a technical guideline an
ordinance is binding for courts. First drafts of the ordinance were prepared by the BMU over
the year 1988. Operators of waste incineration plants, suppliers of incineration and
emission abatement technologies and scientists were consulted on technical possible
reductions. German engineers were frontrunners both on design of incinerators as on
abatement technology. Regarding the discussion about the provisions of the ordinance one
could observe the 'typical' picture. Federal and state Ministries of the Environment,
environmental organisations and citizens’ action groups were in favour of strict emission
limits. Operators of waste incineration plant, their organisations, and the Ministry of
Economics (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft – BMWi) opposed tight limits. The German
states, especially the Environmental Ministers' Conference (UMK), played a very active
role. They demanded emission limits that were much stricter than those of the 'TA Luft
1986'. They also wanted to respond to the citizens’ concerns and get their authorisation
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and enforcement authorities out of the firing line. During the discussions the MWI
operators adopted a rather cooperative strategy although they were not happy with the
costs of the tighter emission limits. The markets, being regional monopolies, allowed the
MWI to rather easily transfer the costs to their clients by charging higher fees. This
mechanism occurs in interaction with the relatively high environmental awareness that
contributed to the legitimacy of the costs to be incurred. As industry's 'spokesman' the
BMWi also dropped their objections. The most problematic emission limit value discussed
was that for dioxins and furans. The BMU strived for an emission limit value of 0.1 ng
TEQ/m3. The Ministry referred to promising results that were achieved in test operations.
Although even the BMU had to admit that it was only very likely but not certain that the
limit value of 0.1 ng. TEQ/m3 could be met, it decided to set this value.
Textbox 1: Stricter German national limits
All municipal waste incinerators had to meet the same limits as
new ones on 1 December,  1996, so there is no transitional
arrangements for incinerators with a capacity of less than 6
tons/hour. Secondly there are no less strict limits for small
incinerators. For all incinerators a 67% more ambitious limit on
Dust and HCl was set, a 50% more ambitious limit on organic
compounds, HF, Cd and Hg a 80% more ambitious limit was set on
HCL and SO2. Pb+Cr+Cu+Mn was regulated 90% stricter.
Additional limits were set on NOx and on dioxins (0.1ng TEQ/m3).
Citizens’ action groups and environmental organisations participated mainly in the context
of the official hearing that took place around the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989.
They proclaimed that even stricter limits were technically feasible although some preferred
to have no waste incinerators at all. Some minor points of the draft ordinance were
changed.
The ordinance was incorporated in German Law as the 17 th ordinance serving the
implementation of the Federal Emissions Control Act (BImSchG) and therefore is called 17.
BImSchV. The German Ordinance on waste incineration (17. BImSchV) is not restricted to
the incineration of municipal waste and also covers combustion plants which were not
solely built to burn waste, but uses waste as just one of a number of fuels (mostly from the
energy sector and cement industry). Regarding the emission limits, scope, and most
measuring procedures, the German ordinance was and still is a lot stricter than the European
Directives. Since it would not have been possible to formulate the ordinance in this short
period of time, preparations obviously began before the European directives were enacted.
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Restructuring the municipal waste incineration sector in Germany
The empirical analysis on Germany focuses on the federal state North Rhine Westphalia
(NRW). North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria are the German states with the highest
number of waste incineration plants4. Experts are of the opinion that the outcomes in other
federal states are comparable.  In August 1989 studies were done in NRW on the abatement
of dioxins, available techniques and the costs incurred in their installation. It led to the
result that there were four suppliers of active coal filters which had already tested their
techniques in test plants and which could guarantee a limit of 0.1 ng TEQ/m3. The
techniques were ready to be applied in large-scale incinerators and could be installed without
entailing excessive additional costs (4-6 Euro/ton of waste).
The government of North Rhine Westphalia negotiated a voluntary agreement with the
North Rhine Westphalia waste incineration sector, the so-called Emission Reduction Plan
for Dioxins from Waste Incineration Plants (Emissionsminderungsplan für Dioxine aus
Abfallverbrennungsanlagen – EMDA). The previously described public’s high concern about
dioxin emissions from municipal waste incinerators and the practised administrative
blocking were the two decisive factors. The agreement not only covered the incineration of
municipal waste, but also integrated incinerators for hazardous and industrial waste. The
deadline for retrofitting the incinerators was set on 1 December 1995. The covenant was
agreed upon in February 1990, ten months before the 17. BImSchV was enacted. Although
the covenant originally covered only dioxin emissions, it soon turned out that the
equipment to abate dioxin emissions could not be separated from the abatement equipment
for the other pollutants regulated in the meanwhile enacted 17. BImSchV. Therefore the
EMDA’s retrofitting deadline (indirectly) applied to the entire abatement technology
necessary to comply with the 17. BImSchV.
The NRW government established a Coordination Committee (Koordierungsstelle) to work
out (in writing) the official agreement, to observe the implementation of the covenant and
to co-ordinate the retrofitting activities in a way that there was always enough capacity for
waste incineration available. The co-ordination committee presented the final agreement in
the beginning of 1991.The covenant included 14 municipal waste incineration plants. Only
a very few small plants did not participate in the covenant. Approximately three
incinerators got exemptions from the deadline because they had special site related
problems. All incineration plants were given 6 months extra to optimise the abatement
equipment after it had been installed.
In NRW 13 of the 14 municipal waste incinerators that participated in the EMDA were
retrofitted. There was only one very small plant shut down and the 17. BImSchV was not
even the decisive reason. The operators independently retrofitted their waste incineration
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plants. They chose and installed flue gas purification techniques, which they regarded
appropriate for their individual plants. When the 17. BImSchV was enacted German waste
incinerators either already had or were just about to put in operation a de-dusting system
(cyclones or electric filters) and some kind of scrubbers to 'wash' the flue gas from acid
substances (dry, semi-dry, semi-wet or wet systems). Therefore the 17. BImSchV mainly
required waste incinerators to additionally install deNOx-systems and devices for the
abatement of dioxin and furan emissions. DeNOx-systems were already in use in other
plants such as LCPs. Operators reported that from the whole bunch of criteria that
influenced the decision on the specific abatement techniques, the question how they could
be integrated in the existing combustion units and abatement equipment was the decisive
one. The retrofitting mainly took place between 1994 and 1996.
Figure 2: Explaining the high level of ambition and outcomes in Germany
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There is a strict monitoring and enforcement system in Germany. In general the plants are
equipped with computers that automatically record and processed the emission data. Once
the devices are installed, the whole system needs to be approved by the supervision
authority. The 17. BImSchV requires MWI operators to have their measurement equipment
once a year checked and calibrated every 3 years. At the end of each year a report on all
emission values of the preceding year is submitted to the supervising authority.
Simultaneously to the retrofitting with pollution abatement equipment, all MWI in
especially NRW were connected to a system for telemetric transfer of emissions
(Emissions-Fernüberwachung – EFÜ) by 1 December 1995. The processed and classified
emission values are automatically transmitted to the supervising authority once a day. In
addition to the emission data the authority has a message on its computer screen which says
whether emission limit values have been exceeded during the last 24 hours. EFÜ makes it
literally impossible to exceed emission limit values without the supervising authority
noticing it. EFÜ even enables supervising authorities to log into the MWI’s electronic
emissions control system at all times and without prior notice to the operators. Moreover,
supervising authorities are authorised to do on-site controls whenever they consider this is
necessary. In most cases the limits are exceeded only for a few minutes. Shortly after the
installation of the abatement equipment emission limit values were exceeded more often
and for a longer period of time. This was repaired by process optimisation. MWI are still
high on the supervision authorities’ list of priorities. It seems to be almost impossible for
waste incinerators to escape the control. In principle the means of coercion can range from
fining to temporary closure of incineration units or revocation of the license.
3.1.2. Netherlands
The relevant story in the Netherlands starts in the mid-70s when the Seveso incident
initiated in the Netherlands research on the issue of sources of dioxins. In 1979 questions
were posed in Dutch parliament about waste incineration in relation to dioxins.
Preparations to issue regulation started. A small research indicated serious emissions of
heavy metals, mercury, cadmium and dioxins (Second chamber of parliament, 1983-1984,
no. 18319). It was followed by a research on the possibilities of pollution abatement
technology. The study concluded that stricter limits were viable. This led to the Guideline
Combustion 1985. The level of ambition for new plants was more or less comparable to the
European Directives, however the treatment of existing incinerators was left in the hand of
the provinces, the licensing authorities. The government was afraid that the costs of living
would rise too much if existing incinerators had to meet the same requirements (Wacque
1990). It has to be emphasised that in the late 1980s and early 1990s the growing
environmental awareness changed the perception of these costs dramatically. Like in the
Germany, these costs became legitimate.
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When the Guideline Combustion 1985 was issued it soon became clear that it did not
demand state-of -the art technology. Stricter limits were issued in Germany and Sweden in
1986. The preparation of a new Guideline started. In 1988 concepts were already presented
that referred to the German limits in the 'TA Luft 1986' and to ongoing discussions in
Germany. The Germans did however not yet have limits on dioxins. The Guideline
Combustion 1989 was issued after an intensive consultation phase. The Association of
Waste Incineration Plants (VEABRIN, nowadays VVAV) and the provinces participated in
the consultation phase. There was no real discussion about the necessity of strict emission
limits. In order to be able to raise the volume of waste to be incinerated, as required by the
general waste policy, the emissions had to be reduced. The market structure, being it
regional monopolies, implied an easy carry on of the costs. Of course these costs became
acceptable in the context of some important developments: During the preparation period
of the 'Guideline Combustion 1989', political and public general environmental awareness
rose strongly and fast in The Netherlands. This awareness included the environmental
effects of waste incineration and the endangerment of human health nearby incineration
plants  (Second Chamber of Parliament, 1988/1989, no. 18319). Raised concentrations of
dioxins were found in the surface nearby incineration plants. Measurement of emissions at
three other incinerators in the Netherlands proved in 1989 emissions that varied from 1.5
ng. TEQ/m3 to 25 ng.TEQ/m3 (Sein, Sluijmer and Verhagen, 1989). In 1989 it became public
that traces of dioxins were found in dairy products made out of milk of cows that grazed in
the Lickebaertpolder. Selling the milk and dairy products was forbidden immediately. Once
German suppliers of pollution abatement equipment were willing to guarantee 0.1 ng.
TEQ/m3 on dioxins the concept 'Guideline Combustion 1989' was settled. The incineration
sector was not amused by some of the aspects of the concept. The incineration sector
started a publicity campaign communicating that they could not accomplish these limits.
The limits on dioxins, dust, SO2, Heavy metals and NOx were debated.  Despite this
opposition the Guideline Combustion 1989 was issued on 15 august 1989, only a month
after the Lickebaertpolder affair had become public. The emission limits were comparable
to those of the mentioned 'ordinance' issued in 1990 in Germany.
Textbox 2: Stricter Dutch  national limits
There is no transitional arrangement for existing incinerators with
a capacity of less than 6 tons/hour, they have to meet the same
requirements as new ones on 1 January 1995. Secondly there are no
less strict limits for smaller incinerators. For all incinerators at
least 80% more ambitious limits are set on Dust, a group of heavy
metals, HCl, SO2 set, a 50% more ambitious limit on organic
compounds, HF, CO and Cd+Hg. Additional limits were set on NOx
and on dioxins. The spell of time for existing large incinerators to
get into compliance was also shortened by one year in the
Netherlands compared to the European requirements.
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However the Dutch government faced huge problems to establish the formal integration of
the European requirements of general rules into Dutch law in time. On 25 April 1991 the
European Commission proved the Netherlands of default. The problem was that a Guideline
like the Guideline Combustion 1989 leaves some discretion space for the provinces that
have to integrate the requirements into the licenses of the incineration plants (compare the
discussions on the status of 'Guidelines' in section 3.1.1). In order to meet the requirements
of the European Directives the emission limits had to be issued in a so-called 'General
Measure of Government' (Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur, AmvB). A Dutch AmvB can be
compared to the German 'Ordinance'. The Combustion Guideline 1989 was based on the
Dutch Waste Treatment and Waste Disposal law. The Dutch law on Waste Treatment and
Waste Disposal did only provide the authority to the minister to issue 'Guidelines' not to
issue AmvB's. So the Dutch Waste Treatment and Waste Disposal law had to be changed.
Simultaneously the existing environmental sector laws in the Netherlands were integrated in
a new single-law framework. Initially the political agenda was to integrate the Dutch law on
waste treatment and waste disposal into this new framework and at the same time establish
the necessary authority to issue an AmvB. Because of these technicalities the
transformation process into a single-law framework was slow. On  17 October 1990, the
Dutch Parliamentary Commission on European Affairs and the Dutch Parliamentary
Commission on Environmental Affairs discussed the issue in a joint meeting with the
Minister of Environmental Affairs. Several political parties insisted upon an increased
tempo of settlement (Second Chamber of Parliament, TK 1990/1991, 21109, no. 29).
Subsequently a proposal to change the old law on waste treatment and waste disposal was
brought forward (Second Chamber of Parliament, TK 1991/1992, 22503, no. 1-2). This
amendment of the existing law provided the Minister of Environmental Affairs with an
authority to issue general rules by AmvB (article 53a, Stb. 1992, no.378). On  28 June
1991, the Dutch government explained to the European Commission that it would fulfil its
obligations soon. The scope and strictness of the requirements in the AmvB are in line with
the Dutch Combustion Guideline 1989. The Minister of Environmental Affairs perceived
softening those requirements as not acceptable. The draft AmvB was pre-published on 3
April 1992. The proposed time schedule raised some discussions on the date the 'existing'
waste-incineration had to comply with the same requirements as new incinerators. In the
Guideline Combustion 1989 and the draft proposal the date was set on 30 November 1993.
The date was replaced by 1 January 1995. This in order to prevent foreseeable and to be
tolerated offences.  For the incineration of domestic waste the old Guideline Combustion
1989 was finally withdrawn on 7 January 1993 and replaced by the Directive Air-pollution
Waste Combustion (In Dutch: Besluit luchtemissies afvalverbranding). The issued limits,
although identical to those in the Guideline Combustion 1989, go far beyond the standards
in the European Directives 89/429/EEC and 89/369/EEC. The Dutch case is also illustrated
and summarised by figure 2 that also explains the Dutch national ambition level and
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outcomes. Compared with figure 2, the additional and deviant explaining factors was the
firm choice within the Dutch national waste policy to favour incineration over landfill.
This was partly driven by emerging large-scale contamination of soil near landfills also
threatening quality of groundwater.
Restructuring the municipal waste incineration sector in the Netherlands
Very unlike the normal Dutch tradition of consultation, the final decisions on the Guideline
Combustion 1989 were made very quick and not on a consensual basis. As an initiative to
settle following conflicts a study and advisory group was formed: Representatives of the
Ministry of Environmental affairs, the provinces and the incineration-sector jointly worked
in a working group (Stuurgroep Uitvoering RV’89) in order to assess and co-ordinate the
implementation of the Guideline Combustion 1989. In this study and advisory group the
ministry, the provinces, the Veabrin (trade-association) and some advisors studied several
aspects and consequences of the implementing the Guideline Combustion 1989. In its final
report the 'Stuurgroup Uitvoering RV’89' disputed whether the limits for dioxins, mercury
and for NOx were achievable. The minister stuck to the Guideline Combustion 1989 with
the exception of dioxins for existing incinerators. The 0.1 ng/m3 limit should be considered
not as an absolute standard but as a guideline for existing incinerators, but still 0.4 ng/m3 was
set as an absolute standard and this could not be done without obligations to reduce. In two
cases the 0.4 limit was used with obligation to reduce to 0.25. For the NOx-techniques a
subsidy of 39 million guilders was granted. The NOx limit itself should be achieved at 1
January 1995. The 'Stuurgroep Uitvoering RV'89' also assessed that four existing
incinerators were too badly designed and old-fashioned to meet the requirements from the
Combustion Guideline 1989. In total seven incinerators were closed including one small
incinerator that was privately owned. In the period 1989-1996 four new incinerators for
municipal waste were licensed, two of them were rebuilds of closed old incinerators. Six
incinerators were retrofitted. The retrofitting-choices made reflect local circumstances and
previous choices among which the resulting possibilities to connect to existing units and
existing abatement equipment.  In most cases the abatement line includes electric and/or
canvas filters a two-step wet-washer or comparable technique, active coal injection or
active coal filters to reduce emissions of dioxin and furans and NSCR or SCR techniques to
reduce NOx emissions.
Referring to figure 1, also for the Netherlands the strict system of monitoring and
enforcement has to be emphasised. The incineration plants are equipped with measuring
sensors and with computers that automatically record and process the data on emissions of a
number of substances. The system is part of the licensing procedure and is checked by the
authorities. Plants have to report to the authorities. The frequency of monitoring visits to
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municipal waste incinerators is high. It is not unusual if the province visits the plant every
month. A large comprehensive inventory for the Waste Board of the Ministry was done in
1995, monitoring the new standards for 'existing' incinerators. In a group of 212
measurements 206 were within the limits of the Dutch regulation. None were over the
limits of the European regulation (Hesseling, Kuipers, Wormgoor, 1995). The authorities
knew about these breaches and were working together with the involved plants to solve the
issues. Some issues were solved because a plant was closed in 1995 and was replaced by a new
one. There was however one exception made in Dutch practice: The Dutch authorities
tolerated that one existing waste incinerator did not comply with the new Dutch regulations
on 1 January 1995. They got postponement until 1 December 1996. For the limited
number of breaches, the means for coercion are in principle comparable to the German
case.
3.2. The laggards catching up activities
The central issues and events that dominated the story lines in France and the United
Kingdom are quite different. In section 3.1.1 the French case will be presented. It will be
summarised in figure 2. Afterwards the United Kingdoms case will be presented and will be
summarised in figure 3. In the UK-case something that looks like a little 'quantum leap'
emerged.  
3.2.1. France
Prior to the integration of the European Directives into national law, an arrêté of 9 June
1986 regulated the atmospheric emissions. New plants and plants expanding their capacity
were addressed by this regulation when authorised from 10 July 1986 onwards. Standards for
these plants were set on dust, HCL, gaseous hydrocarbon, Cu, Pb, Zn, Ni, Cr, Su, Ag, Co, Ba,
Hg+Cd, As and O. The 'arrêté' was slightly less strict than the European Directives of 1989
however addressed more and different atmospheric pollutants. In comparison with the
European Directives there were no emission limits set on HF, SO2 and CO, and on average
the limits were 30-50% more lax. The limits set on a group of heavy metals was
comparable to the European demands. Regulation on incinerators with a capacity of less
than 1 ton/hour was marginal. The 'arrêté' takes an integrated approach, specifying as well
standards for the prevention of water pollution from incineration residues, requirements for
noise prevention and the treatment of remaining waste, such as slag (arrêté du 9 Juin 1986).
However, only few incinerators where authorised between 1986 and 1991. For existing
incinerators solely emission limits for dust existed before 1991.
At the time the European Directives were adopted France was a country where public
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concern about environmental or health effects of waste incineration basically was absent. In
the French public opinion waste incineration was believed to be 'clean' whereas landfill was
believed to be more problematic. Concern about dioxin emissions from incineration plants
and its effects on health started around 19975.
Textbox 3: French national standards
In the 'arrêté' of 25 January 1991 the level of ambition equals that
of the European Directives. In some cases less frequent controls of
emissions are required. Unlike the Directives, however, the French
law takes an integrated approach. It defines requirements with
respect to solid residues of waste incineration, such as slag, and
residues of the flue gas treatment, in particular for their disposal
(landfill), transport and elimination. The 'arrêté' furthermore
defines requirements and standards for the prevention of water
pollution and noise.
The Ministry of the Environment (MATE) and the Agency for Air Quality (Agence pour la
qualité de l'air, former ADEME) perceived the fact that in France for existing plants there
existed only emission limits for dust as not sufficient. At that time waste incineration had
been identified as major source of pollution of HCL, mercury and other pollutants. France
believed to be able to more or less comply with differentiated emission limits as decided
upon in the European arena. Therefore the subsequent transposition of the Directives did
not lead to noteworthy discussions or conflicts. France decided to integrate the minimal
European requirements into national law and not to raise the level of ambition for air
emission standards. An 'arrêté' of 25 January 1991 is the transposition of the 1989
European Directives into French law and currently this law specifies atmospheric emission
limits for new and existing municipal waste incinerators.
Deviant from the European Directives, the 'arrêté' considered plants licensed after 8 March
1991 as 'new' plants. The integrated approach in the French law caused uncertainties and by
that influenced the restructuring of the incineration sector in France. These issues
concerned the possibilities and requirements of slag re-use and recycling and the disposal of
off-gas cleaning residues of municipal waste incineration pertained between 1991 and 1994
and by that introduced uncertainty in the incineration sector.
Restructuring the municipal waste incineration sector in France
In the late eighties, most French municipal waste incineration plants were only equipped
with off-gas de-dusting facilities (Milhau & Pernin 1994). Generally these were electro
filters for big incinerators and mechanic de-dusters (such as cyclones) for small incinerators.
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According to publications only about 25 plants installed technology to wash combustion gas
by the end of the 1980s or where on their way to do so.
In France best information on compliance was available on individual ovens.  Finally, in
France about 134 ovens of plants with a capacity of more than 6 t/h were retrofitted,
although 61 of them were late compliant, being retrofitted between 1997 and 2000. Only
two ovens remained non-compliant. In the category of ovens of plants with a capacity
between 3 and 6 t/h, 19 ovens had been retrofitted in 1997 and 24 had not yet been
retrofitted. The number of retrofitted ovens belonging to smaller plants is low, if there are
any at all. So in general quite a number of large plants' ovens were brought into compliance
too late and there is still a high share of non-compliance amongst ovens of smaller plants.
There is a number of factors that influenced norm-realisation in France. The first factor is
the large number of -often small- plants, contrary to the situation in the other IMPOL
countries. The second factor was uncertainty due to the still developing and unstable
national waste policy. The market prospects for incineration were diffuse. A new waste law
of 1992 changed the hierarchy of waste treatment modes and new requirements for
packaging waste recycling which were also defined in 1992. Within regions debates were on
how to develop the waste treatment in each region, and investment decisions were slowed
down. Choosing between the options was further hampered by uncertainty about the
requirements for the treatment of off-gas cleaning residues. This concerned the possibilities
and requirements of slag re-use and recycling ('valorisation de mâchefers') and the disposal
of off-gas cleaning residues of municipal waste incineration (so-called REFIOM, 'résidus
d’épuration des fumées d’incinération des ordures ménagères'). With respect to the off-gas
cleaning residues the discussions were about the level of quality of their treatment that was
to be reached and which was not finally defined in the arrêté of 1991. Interaction with
other law stopped this discussion: the publication of an arrêté (arrêté of 18 December 1992,
published on 30 March 1993) dealing not specifically with REFIOM but with industrial
hazardous waste landfills and defining requirements for waste to be disposed off in these
landfills. Off-gas cleaning residues and slag belong to this group of waste. The arrêté
demanded to 'pre-treat and solidify' ('stabiliser') the off-gas cleaning residues before
disposing of them in landfills for hazardous waste (landfills of class I)6. The technical term
'stabiliser' means a chemical operation that consists in mixing the residues with a binding
component so that leakage is avoided.
Uncertainty was increased when in 1993/1994 the discussions about the project of a new
European Directive for municipal waste incinerators started. In this case, even the future
requirements became unclear. First it was expected that the Directive would be adopted
rapidly and again, investment decisions were postponed and the actors remained in a waiting
position. Meanwhile, the adoption of the Directive was delayed. Finally, a new uncertainty
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was added when the French Environmental Minister in April 1998 criticised the high share
given to waste incineration in the waste plans and demanded a revision of the waste plans.
Figure 3: Explaining the national level of ambition and outcomes in France
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Thirdly, there was a political dimension introduced by the municipal elections in 1995. I t
can be assumed that from about one year before municipal elections onwards no new
investment projects are undertaken that might induce tax increases. And it takes about a
further year after elections until projects are restarted. Fourthly, public opinion considered
waste incineration as clean and landfills as problematic. Only recently this changed.
Therefor contrary to the situation in Germany and the Netherlands public pressure was
absent. The fifth factor was an insufficient financing capacity. The necessary high
investments for compliance were difficult to finance for a lot of municipalities. The
problem was deepened by the integrated approach of the 1991 'arrêté' including
requirements for the treatment of solid and liquid residues and by the large number of small
municipalities, owing to which an installation of large plants requires a co-operation
between municipalities, which is difficult6. The sixth factor, ignorance might play a decisive
role with respect to the very small incinerators. In several cases municipalities might not
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even know that their very small incinerators belong to the 'installations classées' and/or
believe that they comply with the law owing to their mechanic filters. These plants
frequently are really small units, often of a capacity below 1t/h and often only used a few
days a week.
We come to a seventh and possible important explaining factor for the low level of
compliance in France: the regulatory style. Imperfect enforcement is a characteristic of the
French regulatory style, including the emission measurement and reporting requirements.
The application of the 1991 'arrêté' has not necessarily been the priority. The local French
licensing and enforcement bodies (DRIRE) are in charge of a large area of activity: the
application of the legal texts originating from the three respective Ministries: research,
industry and the environment. The balance of power between local enforcers and politicians
plays a further decisive role for low enforcement. The prefects find themselves opposite of
strong elected representatives and some of them do not want to put pressure on
implementation. Additionally, even if the prefects wish to enforce a law they cannot do
much if the mayors are against it. The general picture is a flexible monitoring and
enforcement focussing on large incinerators.
Quantitative analysis on compliance decisions
A quantitative analysis indicated a general positive link between the size of plants and the
decision to comply (opposed to not comply) as well as for the decision to comply on time
for big incinerators. This is in line with the existence of economies of scale in abatement
effort, making compliance relatively less costly for bigger plants. There was a trend that
ovens of big incinerators with energy recovery were rather brought into compliance on time
while those without energy recovery rather complied late. Amongst ovens of incinerators
of a capacity between 3 and 6 t/h there is a comparable trend: The compliance rate amongst
ovens with energy recovery is much higher than that of ovens without energy recovery.
Unlike for big incinerators, for plants of small incinerators (plant capacity between 3 and 6
t/h) age seems to play a role for the compliance decision: the average year where the ovens
where put into operation of compliant ovens is 1981 compared to the year 1976 of non-
compliant ovens. A limited analysis showed a positive link between subsidies and
compliance of plants. Subsidy could well be a result of a compliance decision, there is no
comprehensive information on the allocation process. However France was the IMPOL
country with the most substantial subsidy schemes for retrofitting incinerators. No
significant differences were found between private or public character of ownership or
operation. Enforcement efforts were only found in 28 cases out of the 75 non- or late
complying ovens belonging to big plants. In 47 cases there were none taken. Furthermore,
strict enforcement measures so far seem to have only been taken towards big incinerators.
Furthermore, pressure from the side of the public authorities came late. Apart from one
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case, the plants for which enforcement measures were taken already reached compliance or
will soon reach compliance by investment, replacement or the closure of ovens8. There are
about 5 to 6 big plants where the decision to shut down the plant was linked to the fact that
they did not comply with the Directive's 1996 requirements. In some cases it was the local
regulator (prefect) who enforced the closure. In some cases it was suggested that the
municipality itself decided to stop operation because of local problems, such as dioxin
pollution (example: plant Lille), and the fact that the plant was not in compliance. This has
been true especially for the region Nord Pas-de-Calais. As a general fact, dioxin pollution
has been a means of enforcing the Directive. We furthermore find that the strictest
enforcement measures were rather taken against the - on average - older ovens. With
respect to small incinerators, enforcement measures have been even less strict than towards
big incinerators. The difference in strictness of enforcement (of measurement and emission
standard compliance) between big and small plants may in parts explain the lower
compliance rate of the small incinerators.
Recent enforcement efforts
Recently, the French Ministry for the environment exploited dioxin incidents in 1998 for
enforcing the 'arrêté' of 1991. The fact that the dioxin topic got on the political agenda in
France is partly explained by a Greenpeace campaign of 1996 and subsequent campaigns of
CNIID (the National Centre of Independent Information on Waste). The Greenpeace
campaign dealt with municipal waste incineration in general and with dioxin pollution in
particular. In early 1997, France started its official policy towards dioxin pollution with the
circular of 24 February 1997. The circular demanded new municipal waste incinerators to
meet the emission standard of 0.1 ng TEQ/m3. Secondly there was the circular of 30 May
1997, asking for dioxin emission measurement of big emitters, including the municipal
waste incineration plants of a capacity of at least 6 t/h. It should be noted here, that a
circular is not legally binding for the plants, but rather constitutes a recommendation to the
prefect to include these requirements into the plant licenses and by this to anticipate the
future Directive9. The measurement campaign following the circular and the generally rising
concern about dioxin led to a media crisis: in January 1998 measurements had revealed a
heavy contamination of cow milk with this pollutant in the vicinity of the Lille waste
incineration plant.
The dioxin problem, which was discussed in the media, was thus a measure of persuasion for
the enforcement of the Directives: The MATE clearly stressed that compliance with the
Directives allowed a first reduction of dioxins. The MATE actually used this political
leverage to enforce the 'arrêté' of 1991. These two debates were thus linked to each other.
For the first time, the new left wing Environmental Minister took a stricter attitude towards
the prefects and summoned the prefects of the regions which showed a delay in compliance
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to ask them to take action. She asked them to bring the incinerators of a capacity above 6
t/h into compliance with the 1989 Directive, otherwise these plants would have to be closed
down. This was written down in a 'circulaire' of 26 August 1998 (circulaire du 26 août 1998;
cf. Desachy 1999).
3.2.2. United Kingdom
There was little regulation on municipal waste incineration prior to 1989. The plants were
not subject to any system of prior authorisation, detailed emission limits or monitoring of
emissions. The government was aware of the laxity of the existing regulation and proposed
in 1986 to bring the municipal waste incineration plants under the control of her Majesties
Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP). This would have made them subject to prior
authorisation and a requirement to use 'best practical means' for pollution abatement (House
of Lords, 1989). This proposal was part of a consultation paper 'Air Pollution Control in
Great Britain'. The initiator of the paper was the Department of the Environment, the
paper aimed at changes to UK legislation to make it compatible with existing and
prospective EC environmental Directives (DOE 1986). The proposal was not implemented
for several years. Finally the 'stop-gap' Health and Safety (Emissions into the
Atmosphere)(Amendment) Regulation 1989 brought all incineration processes, including
municipal waste incineration plants with a capacity of more than 1 t/h under HMIP (Loader,
1991). EC pressure for implementation played an important role10 . When the 1989 MWI-
Directives had to be integrated some local authorities associations were involved in the
political process. One of them the Association of District Councils expressed some concern
that the closure of plants would lead to the increased transport of waste to landfill in rural
areas. The Association of Metropolitan Authorities lobbied unsuccessfully for the
Department of Environment (DOE) to fund the necessary upgrading of existing MWI
plants. The in politics influential environmental organisation National Society for Clean
Air and Environmental Protection (NSCA) lobbied unsuccessfully for the DOE to build a
state of the art plant using foreign designs and technology, to assist with implementation of
the 1989-Directives (House of Lords, 1989). Both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace UK
have taken a much more hostile position with respect to waste incineration. However, there
is little evidence to suggest that either Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace already played
an influential role in the UK implementation of the 1989-MWI-Directives. Some ‘grass
roots’ community organisations have campaigned against existing and proposed MWI, on
human health and environmental grounds. Over 50 such organisations are currently active
in the UK, although they became more active and more influential during the 1990s. Such
organisations have frequently used the opportunities for public participation and objection
presented by the UK’s planning system to successfully oppose or significantly delay
construction of new incineration plants.
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In a debate in the House of Commons it was concluded that the costs for up-grading the
sector would also be broadly in line with costs incurred for domestic environmental reasons
by the 1986 document (Haigh 1997). An important factor was the discussion about the
implications of the tight fiscal control of local government expenditure that was
maintained by the Department of Environment (DOE) during the relevant time-span as
well of its own departmental expenditure. This basically implied limited finances to invest
both by the ministry as well as by the municipalities that owned incineration plants.
Textbox 4: National standards in the UK
All municipal waste incinerators with a capacity of more than 1t/h
had to meet the same limits as new ones at 1 December 1996. For
all incinerators from 1-3t/h a 70% more ambitious limit on Dust
and HCl was set, an 80% more ambitious limit on PB+Cr+Cu+Mn
was set and a 50% more ambitious limit on HF was set. For all
incinerators with a capacity of more than 3t/h a 80% more
ambitious limit was set on PB+Cr+Cu+Mn and a 40% stricter limit
on HCl. On top of that there was also a limit set on dioxins of 1 ng
TEQ/m3
 combined with an obligation to reduce. Finally there is an
additional limit set on Nox.
The UK Government has consistently taken a more relaxed view of the risks associated
with dioxins than the US EPA and a number of European governments did. A 1989 report
by the DOE found no 'convincing evidence of a link between exposure to dioxins and
cancer'. In 1989 the Department of Environment (on the basis of research commissioned
with Warren Spring Laboratories) estimated that the MWI sector contributed up to 25% of
UK dioxin and furan emissions. Since 1995 Her Majesties Inspectorate of Pollution had
revised this estimate upwards, to suggest that the sector accounted for about 70% of total
UK dioxin emissions.
The United Kingdom did not integrate the European Directives into national regulation by
December 1990 as required. The Commission took formal infringement proceedings against
the UK in May 1991. Formal transposition of the 1989 MWI-Directives into UK law was
done in November 1991 and achieved by Directions (the Municipal waste Incineration
Directives) issued under section 7 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The 1990
Act brought a more integrated and centralised approach.  Incinerators with a capacity of
more than 1t/h have to meet the Integral pollution Control regime (IPC). It includes prior
authorisation and operating Best Available Techniques Not Entailing Excessive Cost
(BATNEEC). Detailed advice on what constitutes BATNEEC for a particular process is set
out in process guidance notes. The Municipal Waste Incineration Direction 1991 instructed
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the relevant regulatory agencies to include conditions in IPC authorisations. It also stated
that no derogation shall be granted for plants with a nominal capacity of less than 1 t/h or
that burns waste derived fuels. For municipal waste incinerators the process guidance notes
were issued by the Chief Inspector of the HMIP. After technical reviews the Chief
Inspector’s 'Process Guidance Note IPR 5/3, Waste Disposal & Recycling Municipal Waste
Incineration' was published on the 1 June 1992.
The European requirements were co-implemented with the Integrative Pollution Control
regime that was introduced under the 1990 Environmental Protection Act. The issued
stricter and more comprehensive UK IPR 5/3 processes guidance note standards are
relevant, particularly the standard set for dioxin emissions. Still the requirements from
European Directives were of importance to push forward these limits.
Restructuring the municipal waste incineration sector in the UK
The existing incineration plants were designed with the principal design criterion to reduce
the volume at low costs. Heat recovery was absent and design was poor. It was also known
that none of the existing UK MWI plants would by far meet the requirements of the MWI-
Directives without significant upgrading. The impacts of the emission limits were huge. It
led to the closing down of about 33 plants in the United Kingdom. The influential factors
where the tight budget policy that prevented investments from municipalities, the
availability of cheap landfill as an alternative for local governments and the reasonable
tight monitoring and control that made closing down the non-complying plants inescapable.
 By the beginning of 1996 only 18 existing plants remained in operation (Haigh 1997).
After the 1 December deadline only three existing MWI plants remained in operation
(Edmonton, Coventry and Nottingham). The Sheffield MWI, the fourth existing plant
equipped with energy recovery, closed temporarily over the deadline whilst upgrading work
was undertaken before subsequently reopening. The Edmonton plant stayed in operation
through the 1 December 1996 deadline, but with a reduced throughput whilst up-grading
work was undertaken. The one other remaining existing MWI plant equipped with energy
recovery - the Sheffield plant – closed temporarily for several months over the deadline
whilst up-grading work was undertaken before subsequently reopening11 . A survey indicated
that 12 existing MWI plants would close by 1994 irrespective of the stricter rules. The
survey also identified a number of factors which would influence local authority’s decisions
on the up-grading or closure of the remaining plant. The cost of up grading to new plant
standards, costs of closing plants and converting them into waste transfer facilities,
availability and cost of landfill (including transport costs), availability and terms of loans
for capital expenditure and energy prices12 .
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Figure 4: Explaining the national ambition level and outcomes  in the UK
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Between 1989 and December 1996 two new large MWI plants had been commissioned in
the UK. They obtained contracts under the Non Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO). The NFFO-
subsidies significantly improved the financial viability of electricity generation from MWI
plants and emphasises the economies of retrofitting present in large incinerators.
In the United Kingdom the Environment Agency stated that its annual inspection program
for a typical incinerator consists of four to six planned visits and up to six additional visits
to investigate complaints and operational problems. The number of visits could rise
significantly where major problems arise, especially where 'public interest is generated'
(House of Lords, 1999).
Under IPC operators are required to report any breaches of their authorisation to the
regulator. Breach of an authorisation condition renders an operator liable to prosecution
under the 1990 Act: maximum penalty a £20,000 fine on summary conviction, or an
unlimited fine and up to 2 years imprisonment on conviction in a higher court. Failure to
comply with a court order could result in action for contempt of court, rendering the
operator liable to sequestration of assets and an unlimited term of imprisonment. Corporate
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liability applies under Section 157 of the Act. However, the regulator has considerable
discretion in deciding whether to prosecute in any particular case.
Almost 500 breaches of emissions limits were reported to the EA between the 1 January
1996 and November 1998 by operators of incinerators (including MW, hazardous waste and
sewage sludge incinerators) licensed under IPC. This figure is likely to be an underestimate as
it is based upon self-reporting by plant operators. The majority of these breaches are
thought to have occurred at MWI plants on HCl, Dust, NOx and CO. It has to be
emphasised that most breaches are believed to be only for a very short period of time. The
exceedences have occurred both on 'new' plants and on 'existing' plants. The absence of
waste separation prior to incineration might contribute to these problems. Substantial effort
has been put in overcoming the problem. The Environmental Agency has used informal and
formal sanctions to achieve changes and now believes that the problems have largely been
solved.
The survival of the UK incineration sector
At the time of issuing the domestic UK-regulation it was already known that the outcome
of the 'quantum leap' in the United Kingdom would be a structural shift towards the cheap
landfill option. Until 1994 there was no recognised trade association representing the MWI
sector as a whole. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has played an important
role in shaping the financial climate for MWI through the nineties. The DTI encouraged
the formation of the Energy from Waste Association that was formed in 1994. It brought
together local authorities with an interest in MWI with energy recovery, private sector
waste management firms and incinerators equipment suppliers. And with the competition of
cheap landfill, it was the promotion of energy recovery technology that was the life-
insurance for a number of plants where the tight budget policy proclaimed the kiss of death
for a lot of bad designed existing waste incinerators without energy recovery. The
Electricity Act 1989 allowed the Secretary of State for Energy to require, by order, public
electricity suppliers to purchase specified capacity generated from non-fossil fuel sources on
long-term contracts, the so-called non-fossil fuel obligation (NFFO). The NFFO was
designed to support the increased market penetration of renewable technologies and also to
subsidise the UK's existing nuclear industry. The electricity supply companies must pay a
premium price for electricity generated under the NFFO. The price being determined by a
competitive bidding process involving potential generators (ENDS, 1994). As a result, the
NFFO significantly improved the financial viability of electricity generation from MWI.
This resulted in six 'new' plants additional to the four 'existing' plants. The total capacity of
the sector has returned to approximately the same level as in the late 1980s although
concentrated in a much smaller number of plants.
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4. Environmental and Efficiency Outcomes
The stories of the implementation of the European Directives and the explaining factors
have been told in the previous section. In this section the outcomes are summarised. In
section 4.1 we present the environmental outcomes followed by the efficiency outcomes in
section 4.2.
4.1. Environmental outcomes
The incineration of waste has some advantages. The directly intended result is the reduction
of waste volume. It is also often argued that incineration reduces the toxicity of waste by
inertization (Eberg, 1997: 72). If energy recovery systems are installed a third benefit
appears: it might saves fossil fuels by for instance generating electricity or by providing city
heating. Still about 30 % of municipal waste remains as slags and ashes. And even the most
sophisticated abatement technologies do not abate perfectly. Finally some wastewater and
gas cleaning residuals might be produced. Knowledge on the health and environmental
effects from long-term exposures to low levels of the relevant pollutants is limited.
Uncertainty is also present on the extent these pollutants enter food chains and by that
accumulate and pose health risks (Eberg, 1997: 72-73; EC, 1997: 5.1 5.29).
In this section the focus is on the established reduction of the air-emissions from existing
incineration plants. The assessment is linked to the goals of the 1989 European Directive
89/429. The emissions of a number of pollutants are relevant in this context. Just picking
out one pollutant would not be a satisfactory approach. Therefore if data-availability
enabled it, an index is calculated for 'existing' incinerators that expresses average
compliance with the European emission limits on Dust, CO, HCl, SO2, Cd + Hg and HF
13 .
Detailed quantitative data on emissions from incinerators were available for Germany and
the Netherlands.
A second relevant point of view is to what extent the European Directives contributed to
the level of goal attainment and improvements in the IMPOL countries. Table 3
summarises the outcomes followed by some explanations.
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Table 3: Environmental outcomes in the IMPOL countries
France Germany Netherlands United Kingdom
Average emissions as % of EU
limits
> 150%
estimated
3.2%
calculated
15.4%
calculated
< 100%
estimated
Improvement
1990-1995/1996
1994-1996
25% estimated > 90% estimated
57.6% calculated
91% calculated > 90%
Contribution EU-Directives High for large plants
Low for small plants
None None High
The frontrunners: Germany and the Netherlands
In Germany the existing incinerators in North Rhine-Westphalia emitted on average 3.2%
of the emissions allowed by the European requirements. Data of Bavarian MWI show that
they reach comparably low levels of emissions. In Germany the available data on
improvements for North Rhine-Westphalia covers the period 1994-1996. The average
reduction of emissions in NRW over this period was 57.6%. The smaller improvement
compared to the Dutch outcomes can be explained by the time-span of measurement
(1994-1996). In 1994 the average level of retrofitting was already considerable. Over the
period 1990-1996 the emission reduction would probably be equal or even better compared
to the Dutch case. As has been analysed in the previous section the improvements in
Germany and the Netherlands can not be attributed to the European Directives. In the
Netherlands the existing incinerators emitted in 1995 on average 15.4% of the allowed
emissions. The variance reached from 3.9% in the case of SO2 emissions up to 35% in the
case of CO emissions. This performance of existing incinerators was only slightly worse
than the performance of 'new' incinerators. These 'new' incinerators performed on average
9.8% in 1995, variance reached from 3.9% on SO2 up to 22.5% on NO2. In the Netherlands
the relevant period was 1990-1995. The average decrease of regulated emissions over the
research period was 91%. In both countries breaches on national limits are reported
however minimal, breaches on the European limits have to be considered as negligible. It
should be kept in mind that over-compliance on yearly averages is necessary to avoid
breaches of emission limits for a smaller period of time.
France and the United Kingdom
For France data-availability was limited to whether ovens were in compliance or not and to
which technology was applied. Estimates of the level of over-compliance are not available.
Out of 136 cases of ovens belonging to plants with a capacity of more than 6t/h, 61 (45%)
were in compliance with the 1996 deadline, 75 (55%) were not. From the latter population
73 (97%) are late compliance cases, they reach out for compliance between 1997 and 2000.
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Out of 43 ovens belonging to plants with a capacity between 3 and 6t/h, 24 (56%) were non-
compliant in 1997, 19 (44%) were in compliance with the deadline of 1 December 1995.
When it comes to ovens smaller than 3 tons an hour the general impression is that all
plants are non-compliant, if any, clean-up technology is limited to mechanic filters (such as
cyclones). Estimates on the environmental outcomes can be made, however with substantial
uncertainty involved. A substantial number of large plants are late compliant, in transitional
years this could lead to, roughly estimated 60% more emissions than allowed (Schucht,
2000). It is plausible that regulated substances were decreased up to the 40-50% range in
1996, when emissions from large plants are taken into account. Estimates on the emissions
of dust, HCl, Pb, Cd and Hg indicate that the share of the smaller non compliant plants in
total emissions is on average 56% if all large incinerators are assumed to be in compliance
(Schucht, 2000)14 . Assuming a required, highly speculative, abatement level of 80%, it can
be calculated that non-compliance of small plants brings about 45% more emissions than
required on the aggregate level of France. If the emissions of the small plants are taken into
the analysis the improvement in the research period might be something around 25% in
1996 compared to 1990. In France the European Directive was the key driver for the
emission abatement at large plants. On the other hand the European Directives have not
yet been influential towards all small incinerators in France.
In the United Kingdom 33 existent incinerators were found in compliance because they
were closed in time. The status of the remaining four incinerators has to be discussed. A
large number of reported breaches indicate that there are problems. However these can be
very temporary and are reported as breaches on the stricter and more comprehensive UK
regulation. When we take the level of retrofitting into account and the effects of the
monitoring and enforcement efforts described, it is plausible that the existing incinerators
on average are in compliance with the European requirements. Taken the retrofitting of the
four remaining plants into account and the large number of closures it is likely that emission
abatement in the United Kingdom is extremely large, if not the largest. In the United
Kingdom about 80% of the incineration capacity was closed in the relevant time-span.
However it was known that about one-third of the actually closed incinerators were going to
be closed independently from the regulatory setting. Given the retrofitting and the large
number of closures it is plausible to assume that emissions from the waste incineration were
reduced by more than 90% in 1996 compared to 1989. The national British standards are
causally linked to the implementation of the European Directives. The European Directives
in interaction with nation legislation dominantly drove the retrofitting and the closures.
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4.2. Outcomes on cost-efficiency
The kick-off question is why we should care about the allocation of retrofitting costs in the
incineration sector. One argument is found in the large economies of scale when municipal
waste incinerators are retrofitted. A second argument is related to the strongly rising
marginal abatement costs when the level of ambition increases. In a study commissioned by
the EC the internal costs were quantified by assessing costs and performances of six
packages of technology taking into account eight capacities of plants reaching from 25 to
800kton/year. Cost-effectiveness analysis was performed for 6 packages of technology for new
plants. These packages represent three ambition levels and a basic distinction between dry
gas washing and wet gas washing. Cost-effectiveness is interpreted as the fit between
emission abatement costs and emission abatement at individual sources. The simple, less
ambitious packages proved more cost effective than the complex ones. However only the
simplest package appeared on the efficiency frontiers of all pollutants. These frontiers
represent combinations of costs and benefits that cannot be improved upon unless more
money is spend. However, all options occur on the efficiency frontier for some pollutant.
Given the interactions between the abatement of different pollutants this does not surprise.
Somewhere between the smallest level of ambition and the most ambitious level of ambition
there is a breakpoint, beyond which benefits only can be reached at larger costs, normally
two to ten times less cost-effective. However, the justification of a package of technology
depends also on the relative emphasis on the involved pollutants. For instance strict limits
on dioxins can imply that the most costly package that for other pollutants is not
necessarily cost-effective, becomes cost-effective in general (EC 1998: 4.1- 4.12).
Considerable economies of scale appeared. For retrofitting existing plants the numbers for
total abatement costs varied between 16 Euro/ton waste incinerated (
E/t) for a 24 kton plant to 9
 E /t
for a 200 kton plant. The most costly option, reaching for the German and Dutch limits
was calculated at 31 E /t and 14 
E/t for retrofitting existing plants that did not have any
abatement technology before. Also for plants larger than 200 kton/year economies of scale
remain, however less substantial. Plants smaller than 25 kton/year are confronted with very
large economies of scale. The data presented are based on UK costs, French costs proved
15% higher and German costs proved 30% higher (EC 1998).
Secondly, it is important to assess whether these cost-characteristics are taken into
consideration when allocating abatement patterns over individual sources in the waste
incineration sector. The policy instrument in use might influence the allocation of
abatement efforts over individual sources and by that cost-effectiveness. By theory,
allocation is optimal when the abatement patterns over individual sources are allocated in a
way that the marginal cost of the last unit of pollution abated is the same for every
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emission-source. It is assumed that this theoretical position can most easily be approached
if economic instruments are used. Abatement will continue until marginal costs of
abatement are up to the cost of an unit of pollution. It is assumed that negotiated
agreements, differentiated emission standards and finally uniform emission standards follow
the economic instrument in efficiency. Legal regulations might lead to allocative
inefficiency if they either impose different requirements on plants with equal -marginal-
abatement costs or impose the same requirements on companies with different -marginal-
abatement costs. Because the European Directives set plant related differentiated emission
limits, a certain basis for inefficiency is created. National standards and the implementation
process might have increased or decreased the level of allocative efficiency.
Thirdly economic theory assumes that the allocated abatement efforts are realised most
cost-effective if the better-informed agents decide. It is often assumed that the individual
firm has best knowledge on abatement options and involved cost characteristics, followed
by industrial actors like sector trade organisations, local regulators and national regulators.
The weight of the better-informed agent in the decision-making is therefor an important
indicator. In all IMPOL countries the management of individual plants decided in freedom
between alternative abatement packages. The operators chose and installed flue gas
purification techniques that they regarded appropriate for their individual plants. Next to
effectiveness in reducing emissions arguments were found in the possibility of integration
into existing pollution abatement equipment, availability of absorber substances, the
usability and markets for residuals, experiences, belief in robustness, stoppage time for
transforming, the hinder on primary process, capital costs and running costs. The only
restriction was often in the licensing process, the local regulator had to be convinced that
the emission limits would not be exceeded. This does however not refer to the freedom of
choice, it refers to the robustness of choice and underlying information. There are some
signals that management of small incineration plants in France and old-fashioned
incineration plants in the UK sometimes were ignorant to some level. It seems that the
involvement of co-ordinating organisations on sector level can improve the quality of
information and decision-making. There are no arguments found against the assumption
that de-central decision-making in combination with high quality information lead to the
most cost-effective decisions. Describing the decision-making as decentralised does not
imply that other actors like national and local governments, trade associations and
engineering firms were not involved in preparing and co-ordinating decisions.
The frontrunners: Germany and the Netherlands
For Germany and the Netherlands it was possible to collect data on cost-effectiveness. Some
uncertainties are involved, the management of German plants had some difficulty to
disentangle investment costs and some assumptions were made to be able to calculate and
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compare15 . However, table 4 presents in the third column comparable data on yearly total abatement
costs /ton waste capacity. In the fourth column the individual abatement patterns are summarised
while in the fifth column the fitness between pollution abatement differentiation and the
total yearly abatement costs is expressed. It should be kept in mind that the European
emission limits were set in mg/m3 combustion gas.
Table 4: Cost effectiveness retrofitting existing incinerators
 and fit between abatement patterns and costs (in Euro)
Characteristics
incinerators (year of
instalment and
capacity expressed as
kilotons/year)
Total yearly
abatement
costs
Total yearly
abatement costs/
ton waste
capacity
Improvement average
compli-ance 90-95
expres- sed as
average % of EU-
limits (%
improvement)
Total yearly
abatement
costs/units
improvement
(each ton
capacity)
Dutch incinerators
A-1973-945kt. 32636364 34.5 351 - 12 (96.6%) 0.1
B-1963-375kt. 10227273 27.3 313 - 14.5 (95.4%) 0.1
C-1973-158kt. 7500000 47.5 63 - 29  (49.3%) 1.4
D-1975-315kt. 5363636 17.0 36.5 - 21.5 (41.1%) 1.1
E-1986-69kt. 5318182 77.1 29.7 - 18.7 (37.0%) 7.0
German incinerators
NRW
Improvement average
compliance 94-96
F- 1981-240kt. 8300000 34.6 4-2.1  (47.5%) 18.2
G- 1965-389kt. 5100000 13.1 5.7-4.1 (28%) 8.2
H- 1960-710 kt. 15100000 21.3 18.2-11.4  (37.4%) 3.1
I-  1966-115kt. 8300000 72.2 22.8-12.1 (46.9%) 6.7
J-  1982-261 kt. 7300000 28.0 8.8-4.9 (44.3%) 7.2
K- 1970-175 kt. 23400000 133.7 32.2-21.0 (34.8%) 11.9
L- 1972-450 kt. 36300000 80.7 17.9-5.8 (67.6%) 6.7
M-1969-84 kt. 3700000 44.0 25.9-11.0 (57.5%) 3.0
Globally the new 2000+ European Directive sets limits on air pollution that are comparable
to the Dutch and German limits. Surprisingly the costs for Dutch and German existent
incinerators are in a number of cases substantial higher than estimated by the above-
mentioned research. At German cost level, for 25 kton plants 40 Euro was estimated and
for a 200 kton plant 18 Euro (EC 1997). A possible explanation might be the considerable
level of over-compliance to national standards in both Germany and the Netherlands. Still
over-compliance on yearly averages is necessary to avoid breaches of emission limits for a
smaller period of time. The even larger level of over-compliance in Germany might explain
the substantial higher costs. If we include column 4 in the analyses it proofs that some
incinerators with broadly comparable environmental performances also report somewhat
comparable costs. Analyses of most of the fourth and the fifth column shows how large the
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economies of scale really are and how expensive it gets when the abatement levels are
getting very high like in the cases of some German incinerators. However it has to be
acknowledged that the data on the German incinerators in the fifth column are probably
overestimating the costs: The improvement on average compliance in the fourth column
was expressed for the period 1994 - 1996. In Germany, improvements over the period
1990-1996 almost certainly were larger. We have to be furthermore careful because of the
fact that the German estimates of costs might fail to disentangle the time horizon precisely,
they might include all retrofitting costs for the period 1990-1996.
It is beyond doubt that it is more expensive to comply with more ambitious regulations.
The assumption that unified emission limits, not taking into account cost characteristics of
the individual source, are inefficient is supported by the outcomes. The smaller incinerators
were faced with huge marginal costs because of the uniform emission standards in Germany
and the Netherlands. One might also argue that given the high level of ambition in these
countries the possibilities to reallocate emission abatement are limited due to technological
constraints. Contra-arguments are found in the substantial variety on plant-capacity that
reflects variety on marginal and average abatement costs. In the EC study it proved that a
capacity of 200kton onwards the economies of scale are not that large anymore (1997).
However there still remain economies of scale and there are also a number of smaller
incinerators in Germany and the Netherlands.
A final argument has to do with the local character of some of the pollutants like dust and
dioxins. Having no definitive information on the effects on the environment and health it
is not possible to answer the question to what extent limits for the relatively smaller plants
could be reduced. Just by the observation that the limits are in mg/m3, the absolute emissions
are probably larger near larger plants. If these absolute emissions are found to be politically
acceptable, from an ecologically point of view less ambitious limits could be used for
relatively smaller plants. The conclusion therefor has to be that the efficiency of allocating
abatement efforts and cost-effectiveness was relatively low in Germany and the
Netherlands.
France and the United Kingdom
For France, quantitative analysis revealed a positive relation between compliance and the
size of the plant, this is an efficient result in terms of costs because of the already indicated
economies of scale. More recent and bigger ovens and ovens with energy recovery
technology were often upgraded whereas older and smaller plants and plants without energy
recovery technology where left in a waiting position, were replaced or closed down. That
plants with energy recovery show a higher level of compliance can be considered as an
outcome caused by a contextual French policy. The large number of non-complying smaller
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plants will probably be closed in the end. Within the perspective of the large economies of
scale while retrofitting this has to be considered as an efficient outcome. Some discussions
might arise whether it is justified to assess situations of non-compliance as efficient. Cost-
effectiveness and efficiency of allocating abatement efforts as economic concepts do not
distinguish between legal and illegal situations. Seen from the viewpoint of the allocation of
abatement efforts it was probably efficient to abate nothing at the small plants and allocate
the abatement efforts over the larger plants that have lower marginal and average
abatement costs. With the same money a lot more can be abated at the larger plants. The
not formally taken decision, that in fact just resulted from 'French regulatory style' not to
enforce small incinerators can be considered as efficient16 .
In the European Directives and in French national law equal differentiated emission limits
are used. This can be efficient if the strata are chosen rightly. However it proofs by analysis
that the abatement costs for very small incinerators are still enormous, certainly after the
transitional period ends. The conclusion therefor has to be that the efficiency of allocating
abatement efforts and cost-effectiveness was relatively high in France.
In the United Kingdom a large number of plants have been closed because of the tight
budget policy and the competition of cheap landfill at about 9 Euro/ton. Without taking
externalities from landfill into account, the closures are to be considered as cost-effective
decisions. A few plants with energy recovery technology were retrofitted. This can be
considered as an efficient outcome on allocating abatement efforts influenced by the
contextual energy-policy making energy recovery profitable. The fact that also some big
incinerators without energy recovery technology were closed down cannot be considered as
efficient, however it is linked to other contextual national -tight budget- policy and the
competition from landfill. The United Kingdom issued national limits that are stricter
compared to the European limits, especially the fact that there was no transitional
arrangement until 2000 incorporated for existing incinerators is important. In the case of
the Germany and the Netherlands we had to discuss the issue that possibility to re-allocate
emission abatement might be limited due to technological constraints. This issue could not
be settled definitively. In the United Kingdom the possibilities to re-allocate abatement
efforts were not limited to an extent that it influenced cost-effectiveness. Old incinerators
could be closed easily when it was combined with a shift towards landfill. This option was
open. The conclusion therefor has to be that the efficiency of allocating abatement efforts
and cost-effectiveness was relatively high in the United Kingdom.
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5. Conclusions and Observations
One of the striking outcomes seems to be the contrasting results on environmental and the
efficiency outcomes. The frontrunners Germany and the Netherlands scored relatively well
on the environmental outcomes and less well on efficiency outcomes. France scored not so
well on the environmental outcomes and scored well on the efficiency outcomes. Finally
the United Kingdom scored well on both aspects. The driving forces that led to these
outcomes were described in section 3 and summarised in the figures 1 for Germany and the
Netherlands, 2 for France and 3 for the United Kingdom. Decisive factors in Germany and
the Netherlands seemed to be the relatively large environmental awareness both in the
public sphere and in the private sphere. In between these two, the fact that governments
were manoeuvred or manoeuvred themselves into a position of dependency is of
importance. In both countries not only institutional credibility was at stake but also the
possibility to implement incineration as the chosen waste disposal option. Public action,
incidents, media coverage and administrative blocking made strict emission limits
inescapable. This strategic task was performed without much attention to the allocation of
abatement efforts over individual sources and without much attention on the cost-
effectiveness in individual cases. The latter outcome can not be evaluated positively. The
lack of attention for economic outcomes can be explained by the market structure, being
regional monopolies established that made it easy to pass on the costs. Passing on the costs
and by that raising the price of living was not welcomed however a legitimate outcome of
the shared awareness for the environment both political and among the public in Germany
and the Netherlands. It was the period in which environmental policy was rethought and
strengthened. In France and the United Kingdom it was not easy to pass on retrofitting
costs and the public environmental awareness was a lot smaller. In France the regulatory
style kept a lot of incinerators open while in the UK the rather strict monitoring and
enforcement culture led to a lot of closures and a shift towards landfill. It is however
possible that small French plants will be closed related to the 1 December 2000
requirements' deadline.
The patterns as emerged and described have to be assessed as temporary balances. These
balances were in some countries changed during the research period.
These -dynamics in- interactions between factors out of the 'political sphere' and out of the
'economic' sphere did not stop. For instance in France the incidents with dioxins from
incinerators were reported in the late 90s. Environmental groups enforced environmental
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awareness. Also a political shift -a new left wing minister took office- led to a situation in
which the balance is changing. Forces developed that seem to overcome the French
'regulatory style' which can be analysed as a result of other factors. In the United Kingdom
incineration capacity is raised under the influence of the incentives for energy recovery.
New plants therefor are large and are equipped with energy recovery technology. In
Germany and the Netherlands there are some weak signals that the opening up of markets
might lead to an upward pressure on emissions. This is strongly observed in the case of the
electricity plants as species of Large Combustion Plants, there are also some informal
signals from the Dutch ministry of the environment as far as the municipal waste
incinerators are at stake. In our research there was no proof that publicly owned
incinerators scored better on environmental performances compared to privately owned or
privately managed incinerators. It seems that the market structure in interaction with other
described drivers is influential, not the ownership structure.
A new round of regulation arrives with the new European Directive on Waste Incineration.
In this case it proved that the countries with a high level of ambition issued uniform
emission limits expressed as concentration of a substance in a cubic meter combustion gas.
It also proved that the capacity of the relevant incineration plants varied considerable. A
number of pollutants are notorious for their local and regional impacts. Being aware of
constraints found in packages of technology it still seems possible to take the capacity of
the plants into account when issuing emission limits. Seen from an environmental and
health point of view the nominal emissions are more important to assess local and regional
effects. Nominal emissions are caused by the capacity in use by the plant multiplied by the
emissions each cubic meter. From this point of view it seems logic to not only take
environmental arguments into account but also the arguments that large economies of scale
were found when incineration plants were retrofitted. More environmental improvement
can be reached with the same amount of money. It limits the potential for efficiency
considerable due to the fact that concentration limits on cubic meters combustion gas
diminish the possibilities to transfer abatement from a source with higher marginal or
average abatement costs to a source with lower costs. There are however justifications for
this due to the fact that some emissions have local effects. Cost-benefit analysis indicates
that the externalities of waste incineration are considerable. Definite conclusions can only
be drawn on a case to case basis due to the fact that also the siting and population densities
around an incinerator are of importance. It requires of course that the 'strata' are chosen
rightly when differentiated emission limits are used. To rely on more decentralised
instruments like covenants and economic instruments requires that the environmental and
health arguments still have to be used as constraints when too large economies of scale lead
to too little abatement at small incineration plants.
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Another line of reasoning presented sometimes is that large incinerators cause too large
nominal emissions of pollutants with regional or local impacts. In this line of reasoning the
emission limits for such large plants should be even more ambitious. In this discussion next
to the political and economic arguments the argument of technological development is
introduced. There is no reason to assume that the kind of retrofitting done at the Dutch and
German plants illustrates the end of technological development. There are new technologies
in development that uses mainly techniques of gasification, pyrolysis, fluidized-bed
processing and integrated processes that integrate pyrolysis with incineration or
gasification17 . Eberg concludes that it is hard to forecast whether the modern incineration
plants with effective gas cleaning systems will be replaced by new technologies. Some of the
new technologies perform better on air emissions. If this is going to be a decisive factor
depends on some regulatory aspects. First it is going to be important whether even stricter
limits on air emissions are going to be issued. Secondly regulation on the quality and
usability of residues will be important, the new technologies are producing quite good results
in these fields. For understanding the market mechanism it has to be stated that the new
technologies seem to perform a bit inferior on energy recovery. Although some are
sceptical about these technologies, they are in competition to replace the now usual
technology with extensive emission abatement lines (1997: 66-69).
With regard to the broader European environmental strategy as expressed in the fifth
Environmental Action Program (5EAP) the MWI case leads to some observations. 5EAP
(CEC 1993) focuses on sectors and activities with an emphasis on changing current patterns
of development by co-operation based on shared responsibility. The involvement of
partners such as national governments, business and consumers is seen as crucial. In this
respect '5EAP' speaks of shared responsibilities between governments, business and the
general public. Out of the understanding that the ultimate goal of sustainable development
can only be achieved by concerted action on the part of the relevant actors working
together in partnership, 5EAP aims at a mixing of actors and instruments at the
appropriate levels (CEC 1993: 113). So next to more traditional instruments 5EAP aims at
building institutional capacity among industry and public groups. This includes the
absorption of market incentives by customers. It can not be denied that in some fields
German and Dutch customers are becoming a bit 'greener' consumers. If this penetration of
ecological arguments into the 'economic sphere' appears to be lasting and expanding to
other EU countries, this might well be causing a new balance between factors from the
'political sphere' and the 'economic sphere' in Member States. To anticipate and push these
events, like 5EAP to a large extent does, and not to put effort only in the slow viscous
bargaining between EU countries within the European arenas, could well be a sound strategy
to move towards a more sustainable industry in EU countries. By that 5EAP might not push
European decision-making forward directly, however at least it takes the decisive
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importance of changing the national arena's into account. By this, public environmental
groups and the consumers might play a decisive role. This might be considered as the
'modernisation' of the EU environmental policy towards industry. This lesson learned from
previous decades is supported by the MWI-case and found -dynamics- in explaining patterns
in the MWI case studies.
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Notes
1 Kris R.D. Lulofs, senior research associate, Center of Clean Technology and
Environmental Policy, University of Twente, PO box 217 , 7500 AE  Enschede, The
Netherlands; tel.: +31534894539, fax: +31534894850, e-mail
k.r.d.lulofs@cstm.utwente.nl.
2 AMORCE represents the local municipalities and the private operators of waste
incineration plants.
3 An example of industry doing the minimum necessary to support a 'clean' image of
waste incineration are discussions related to dioxin: industry was not pushing for
stricter standards on an European or international level but they are pushing the
municipalities to upgrade their plants as they do not want to be at the last end of the
standards in Europe. Consequently, they have been asking for dioxin standards in
France for years.
4 For an analysis of the events in Bavaria see Eberg, 1997.
5 With respect to dioxins, in a circular of 24th February 1997, France demands from all
new municipal waste incinerators (licensed after that date) to meet the emission
standard of 0.1 ng. TEQ/m3. This decision anticipates the future European emission
standards. As this concerns new plants only, it does not affect the investigation
undertaken in this case study.
6 With this the juridical uncertainty was solved, however, it took two more years to
solve the technical problems related to the 'stabilisation' of the residues.
7 Costly investment (environmental upgrading) for small plants frequently is
economically not feasible. Where there is no fast alternative to these incinerators,
these plants cannot be easily closed down either. Alternatives, again, would require a
development of the stated co-operation between municipalities, but these structural
changes take time.
8 The remaining big plants that were non-compliant in 1996 were progressively brought
into compliance.
9 Today, France does not regulate dioxin pollution in a binding law. A decision on dioxin
The implementation of the Municipal Waste Incineration Directives Kris Lulofs
Research Paper 2000-B-8  43
requirements to be defined had been suspended until the publication of a toxicology
report on waste incineration and public health published by the "Société Française de la
Santé Publique" (French Society of Public Health) recently, in November 1999 (cf.
Société française de santé publique 1999). This report includes modelisation of
emissions and their behavior in the food chain.
10 ENDS Report, 1989, No. 170: 26.
11 ENDS report: 262, November 1996.
12 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1989), Air pollution
from municipal waste incinertation plants, (HL Paper 17), London, HMSO,
Memorandum by Warren Spring Laboratory, Minutes of Evidence, p. 52.
13 The first step was to calculate the actual emissions for every substance separately,
expressed as a percentage of the allowed emission. The second step was to add up the
calculated percentages and to divide the outcome by the number of pollutants in the
analysis. Detailed quantitative data on emissions from incinerators were available for
Germany and the Netherlands.
14 These estimates middle two scenarios: The first scenario assumes all plants of a
capacity above 3 t/h to comply with the Directive’s requirements for 1996 and 2000
respectively, while plants of a capacity below 3 t/h are assumed to not comply (not
even with the requirements for 1995) but to only be equipped with mechanic filters.
The second scenario assumes as the first scenario that the plants of a capacity above 6
t/h to comply with the Directive while those of a capacity below 3 t/h do not comply.
Different to the first scenario we assume that amongst the group of plants of a
capacity between 3 and 6 t/h only those plants comply with the Directive’s
requirements for 2000 that, in 1997, were complying with the Directive’s 1995
requirements (equipped with fabric filters or electrostatic precipitators), while the
plants not complying in 1997/98 are assumed to not comply in 2000 either (neither
with the Directive’s 1995 nor with it’s 2000 requirements). The following calculations
and estimated take into account the number of French plants in the distinguished
capacities and the data on installed technology and data on ovens of plants in
compliance or not in compliance. These are very rough estimation with high
insecurity related to the assumptions involved and the results have to be interpreted
with precaution.  
15 Assuming that write off is done in 15 years, annuity, full financed, 8% interest; capital
cost on yearly basis can be estimated. The same holds for variable costs. Roughly
estimated capital costs will be 65% of the added costs. Incinerators claim that about 5
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% is spend on add-on by necessary materials. Maintenance takes about 25% of the
costs of running the abatement equipment, 4% is claimed to be added for energy costs
and 1 % for staff-costs.
16 However, the quotient 'total yearly abatement costs/units improvement' cannot be
calculated if no emission abatement has been performed.
17 Gasification is partial oxidation of waste with air or pure oxygen, which produces gases
to be burned or applied otherwise. Fluidised-bed processing is the incineration or
gasification of homogenised waste in a turbulent air/sand mixture that acts like a fluid
and provides for intensive contact burning of particulates. Pyrolysis is de-gassing of
waste, without oxygen, at relatively low temperatures.
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